Motivated by recent path-breaking contributions in the theory of repeated games in continuous time, this paper presents a family of discrete-time games which provides a consistent discrete-time approximation of the continuous-time limit game. Using probabilistic arguments, we prove that continuous-time games can be defined as the limit of a sequence of discrete-time games. Our convergence analysis reveals various intricacies of continuous-time games. First, we demonstrate the importance of correlated strategies in continuous-time. Second, we attach a precise meaning to the statement that a sequence of discrete-time games can be used to approximate a continuous-time game.
Introduction
In this paper we study a class of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring which has been introduced in a continuous-time framework in the important contribution of Sannikov (2007) . As has been convincingly shown in that paper and its followers, continuous-time games are in certain ways analytically more tractable than their discretetime counterparts. Nevertheless, there are still open methodological questions how the continuous-time game model fits into the perceived game-theoretic literature. In particular, it is often heuristically argued that continuous-time games are limit cases of sequences of discrete-time games. The purpose of this paper is to see in which sense this interpretation is possible. We construct a class of discrete-time games which provides a consistent approximation to the class of repeated games studied in Sannikov (2007) , and show that the basic features of the game-theoretic model can indeed be interpreted as limits of sequences of discrete-time games. However, other features of the game model are less clear to interpret. The main obstacle one faces in giving a full-fledged interpretation of continuous-time games as limits of discrete-time games is the notion of a continuous-time strategy. Once passing to the limit from discrete to continuous time, strategy spaces must be enlarged in order to talk about convergence of strategies. 1 As a consequence, limit strategies must be interpreted as correlated strategies (or, abstractly speaking, measurevalued processes), and the limit of these correlated strategies are not easily interpretable in the continuous-time limit game. Nevertheless, we are still able to assign payoffs to the limit game and prove that the limit dynamics of the signal process are diffusions whose drift is controlled by the players' strategies. These facts clearly show in what sense continuous-time games can be interpreted as limits of discrete-time games, and in which sense not.
We feel that an honest study of the foundations of continuous-time game theory is important from a theoretical as well as from an applied perspective. From a theoretical point of view, we are the first who present a rigorous convergence analysis for the aforementioned class of continuous-time games. From an applied point of view, it is important to know that continuous-time games can be derived from discrete-time games, just because all real-world observations are discrete (though may be observed at high frequencies). A continuous-time framework of the strategic interaction can then be regarded as an idealized model, which can be analyzed with the help of powerful analytic tools.
As an independent methodological contribution, we show in this paper that there is a very specific way how repeated games in continuous time can be obtained from the more traditional discrete-time game framework. Our proof of convergence is purely probabilistic, using weak-convergence arguments. This is the weakest form of convergence of stochastic processes one can think of and is the natural one to study strategic interactions in the continuous-time limit. Weak-convergence arguments are nowadays standard in the stochastic control literature (Kushner, 1990) , though have not received that much attention in strategic settings.
Many previous papers in the literature dealing with limits of discrete-time games choose a path-wise approach, which may lead to pathological, or not well-defined out-consider repeated games, and (ii) the dynamic is completely different. Neyman (2013) assumes that the limit dynamic is a Markov jump process in which the players control the transition rates. We instead consider the diffusion case. What we have in common with the work by Neyman (2013) is the concept of convergence of strategies. We will say more on this point later in the paper. 2 Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2010) study a family of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the public signal process follows a discrete approximation of a jump diffusion. Using geometric arguments similar to Fudenberg et al. (1994) , they report a uniform bound (in the limit of frequent actions) on the set of public perfect equilibrium payoffs. While we are not able to say much about the general connection between the sets of sequential equilibrium payoffs of the discrete-time and continuous-time games, 3 we rigorously prove the weak convergence of the game dynamics and the total expected payoffs of the players to corresponding objects of the limit continuous-time game with imperfect public monitoring as introduced in Sannikov (2007) . This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the class of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in continuous time. Section 3 describes the approximating family of discrete-time games. Since the proofs of the main results of this paper are rather technical, we spend some time in motivating them. This motivating discussion starts in Section 4. The main results themselves are collected in Section 4.3. The proofs of the main results are organized in various intermediate lemmas which are stated in Section 6. Technical proofs and additional background information on the concepts we use are collected in extra appendices.
The continuous-time game
We start with a formal description of the repeated game in continuous time which we intend to approximate via a sequence of discrete-time games with frequent moves. This continuous-time game, denoted by Γ, is a straightforward extension of the model presented in Sannikov (2007) to the N-player case. 4
The game dynamics in continuous time
We are given a stochastic basis (W d+1 , W d+1 , P), where W d+1 C(R + ; R d+1 ) is the space of continuous functions taking values in R d+1 , endowed with the metric of uniform convergence on compact sets, and W d+1 is the σ-algebra generated by the cylinder sets. 5 A generic element of the space W d+1 is denoted by w = (w 0 , . . . , w d ). We endow the measure space (W d+1 , W d+1 ) with the Wiener measure P. Let B = (B 0 , . . . , B d ) = (B 0 , B (1) ) be the canonical projection mappings on W d+1 , defined by
Hence, under P, the process (B 0 ,
N players i ∈ I {1, . . . , N} continuously monitor the evolution of a public signal (X t , Y t ). This public signal consists of a (cumulative) signal process X t ∈ R d , and a public correlation device Y t ∈ R. The signal X has continuous sample paths and is given as the unique strong solution to the stochastic differential equation dX t = CdB (1) (t), X 0 = CB (1) (0), where C is a non-singular deterministic matrix. Similarly, the process Y has continuous sample paths and is given by Y t = B 0 (t) for all t. We denote by {X • t } t≥0 and {Y • t } t≥0 the filtrations generated by the processes X and Y, respectively. Additionally, we denote by X t X • t+ and Y t Y • t+ the right-continuous augmentations of the respective σ-algebras. Let
It is important to observe that
. In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring the players' strategies are formulated as functionals over the sample paths of the public signal process (X, Y), satisfying the usual "adaptedness" condition in dynamic games. Definition 2.1. An N-tuple of stochastic processes α = (α i ) i∈I is a public strategy profile if each α i = {α i t ; t ≥ 0} is a {W t } t≥0 -progressively measurable process taking values in the finite set of actions A i available to player i. The set of public strategies for player i is defined as
5 This metric is given by
Remark 2.2. Public strategies, even if defined as processes on the probability space W d+1 , can now be understood as functionals of the sample paths of the signal process (X, Y) because B = (B 0 , B (1) ) = (Y, C −1 X) is the canonical projection mapping on W d+1 . Hence, in the following we write α t =α t (X, Y) if we want to indicate the functional character of the public strategy profile. An important technical reason to choose the (canonical) sample path space as the underlying probability space is that the following change of measure using the Girsanov transformation is quite intricate with an infinite time horizon. On the one hand, one has to take care that there even exists a new probability measure with the desired properties on the given set-up (which works for the path space). On the other hand, this new measure will generally not even be absolutely continuous with respect to the initial measure, whence one cannot take the usual completion of the filtration by null sets. The two measures will only be equivalent when restricted to any W t for fixed t.
Public strategies affect the probability distribution over signal paths via a change of measure. Let b : A ∏ i∈I A i → R d be a given bounded vector-valued mapping, and denote by f : A → R d+1 the map
Hence, the progressively measurable process (t, w) → f (α t (w)) is bounded, so that the stochastic exponential
is a true martingale on the stochastic basis (W d+1 , W d+1 , {W t } t≥0 , P). By the CameronMartin-Girsanov theorem (see e.g. Rogers and Williams, 2000, Theorem IV.38.9) , there exists a unique probability measure
Hence, for every t, the measure
(but P α , a probability mea- 6 In the remainder of this paper we use the following notation consistently. For any separable metric space X, we denote by ∆(X) the set of Borel probability measures on it. Given m ∈ ∆(X) we denote by E m the integral operator with respect to m. Hence, for any m-integrable function f : X → R we write
-6-sure on the measure space (W d+1 , W • ∞ ), need not be equivalent to P), and the process
is a standard (d + 1)-dimensional Brownian motion with respect to {W • t+ } t≥0 under P α . Then the sample paths of the signal process (X, Y) satisfy
Hence, under P α the public signal process X becomes a Brownian motion with drift b(α) and volatility C. In terms of stochastic analysis the tuple
defines a weak solution to the stochastic differential equation
where we recall that α can be interpreted as a (progressive) functional of the paths of (X, Y) and W = (W 0 , W (1) ) is a standard Brownian motion. The main point of interest of a weak solution is the induced distribution on the path space, since one does not fix the stochastic basis (and, in particular, the driving Brownian motion process) a priori. 7 This is the right solution concept when it is not possible to insist on the filtration being the one generated by the driving Brownian motion, which is the natural situation for games with imperfect monitoring by a public signal (and not the noise process).
Remark 2.3. When we discretize the game later on and pass to the limit, we need to account for even less measurability and consider also α as part of the "solution" because one will not be able to regard it as a given functional of the signal paths. Instead one can understand it as a control process to be chosen, in which case (2) becomes a controlled SDE. We demonstrate this concept first in Section 2.3.
Remark 2.4. The reader will have observed that the construction of the game dynamics can be easily generalized to allow for a state-dependent volatility matrix C(x). The con-struction of weak solutions would be entirely analogous to the one described above if one assumes that the data are uniformly elliptic: Assume that there exists a constant c > 0 such that
Payoff processes in continuous-time
In continuous time players receive a continuous flow of payoffs given by 8
The goal of the players is to maximize their normalized discounted infinite-horizon utility
which, by Fubini's Theorem, is equal to
The function g i is the expected utility rate function, defined by
A projection result
Our class of admissible strategies in the game Γ contains implicitly a public correlation device (the independent Brownian motion B 0 ). In order to appreciate the notion of convergence of discrete-time games on which our arguments are based, it will be useful to understand the structure of the continuous-time game when the public correlation device is "averaged out". This will be made precise in this section.
For a given public strategy profile α ∈ A = ∏ i∈I A i we define a ∆(A)-valued {X t } t≥0 -progressively measurable process λ α = {λ α t } t≥0 satisfying 9
Formally, one can interpret this process as an extensive-form correlated strategy (Forges, 1986; Lehrer, 1992) . However, since there are no periods in a continuous-time game, we avoid this interpretation and simply call the process λ α a correlated strategy process. For fixed t, λ α t is easily constructed as the regular conditional probability distribution of the random variable α t , given the information X t . 10 If we took only this definition, we would obtain an X t -adapted process, defined up to sets of measure 0 that depend on t. Since t is a continuous variable, there are uncountably many such null-sets, which eventually causes problems in the definition of the process λ α = {λ α t ; t ≥ 0}. Nevertheless, we can rely on results from filtering theory (see Theorem 2.2.1 in Bain and Crisan (2000)), which guarantee that λ α exists as a {X t } t≥0 -progressively measurable process. 11 We will use the correlated strategy process λ α to construct weak solutions of the controlled SDE (6)
where W(·) is a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion relative to a filtration {G t } t≥0 , and {λ t } t≥0 is progressively measurable with respect to {G t } t≥0 and ∆(A)-valued. Setting Λ(a, t) T 0 λ t (a)dt, we say that the pair (Λ, W) are the driving forces in this equation, whose solution is the signal process X. Λ is a measure-valued random variable on the space A × [0, ∞), with the properties that Λ(A, T) = T for all T ≥ 0, and the random variable Λ(a, T) is G T -measurable for every T. Measures with this property are known as relaxed controls in optimal control theory, and we denote the space of all (deterministic) relaxed controls by R(A × [0, ∞)) ≡ R. 12 All these processes are realized on some underlying probability space (Ω, G, P), which is part of the solution. The next proposition explicitly constructs one weak solution of this controlled SDE. 9 The sigma algebra X t is the augmented version of the X • t . 10 Since A is finite and the underlying sample space is Polish, the regular conditional probability can be defined P-almost everywhere. On the null set where it may not be defined one can modify this process to be the Dirac measure on some arbitrarily chosen action profile a ∈ A. This does not affect the results. 11 We just remark that if players ignore the public correlation device in forming their strategy, then the correlated strategy process is trivial and given by
12 More information on relaxed controls is given in Appendix A.1.
-9-Proposition 2.5. On the set-up (W d+1 , W d+1 , X = {X t } t≥0 , P α ) the signal process X is a weak solution to the stochastic differential equation
where
Proof. By the construction (7), we only have to show thatB α is a standard Brownian motion on the given set-up.B α is X-adapted since X is so and λ α progressively measurable. For any t > s, we compute that
The last equality follows from the following considerations: First, for all s ≤ r ≤ t, the law of iterated expectations gives us
Second, since B α (1) is a P α standard Wiener process, measurable with respect to the filtration {W t } t≥0 , which includes the filtration {X t } t≥0 , we obtain
Hence,B α is an {X t } t≥0 -martingale under P α . Its quadratic variation process under P α is the same as that of B α (1) :
This shows thatB α is a {X t }-Wiener process under the measure P α .
Given the process λ α and its induced relaxed control measure
is a weak solution of the con--10-trolled SDE (6).
In terms of the correlated strategy process {λ α t , X t ; t ≥ 0}, we can compute the expected discounted payoff of player i as follows: Using Fubini's theorem and the law of iterated expectations, one sees that
This expression will be crucial for arguing that the sequence of repeated game payoffs converges to the payoffs in the continuous time model.
The discrete-time game
The family of discrete-time games, denoted by Γ h , is modeled in the standard way. 13 Since we are only concerned with repeated games with public signals and public strategies, we can describe the information sets of the players completely in terms of sequences of realizations of the signal process. Let {ξ n } n∈N be an i.i.d. sequence of random variables with law ρ ∈ ∆(R d ), satisfying the following assumptions:
Assumption 3.1. The probability law ρ satisfies the following conditions:
The first two assumptions are normalizations, while the full support assumption of the measure ρ is needed to support the hypothesis that players only have imperfect observa-13 See Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for an excellent survey of the discrete-time literature.
-11-tions of the actions of their opponents and cannot infer them directly from the realization of the new signal. Formally, we will construct the repeated game dynamics such that the support of the controlled signal distributions is independent of the controls (see eq. (12) and the ensuing discussion). We now come to the explicit construction of the discrete-time game.
The game dynamics in discrete time
Players monitor the evolution of the cumulative signal process
so that the realization of the signal ξ n+1 determines the jump ∆X h n X h n+1 − X h n of the cumulative signal process. Let E = (R d ) N denote the sequence space, and B(E) its Borel σ-algebra. Further, we let P denote the probability law ρ ⊗N and F h n the filtration generated by the process X h , i.e.
Hence, on the set-up (E, B(E), {F h n } n , P) the process X h is a Markov chain with stationary transition probabilities and moments
The public histories in the discrete-time game Γ h are partial sequences of signal realizations, (x 0 , . . . , x n ) ∈ (R d ) n+1 , n ≥ 0. A pure public strategy is a measurable map from public histories to pure actions. Formally, a discrete-time pure public strategy for player i is a collection of measurable functions a i,h
Given the previous signal realizations x [n] = (x 0 , . . . , x n ), player i responds with the action a i,h n (x 0 , . . . , x n ) ∈ A i . A collection of measurable mappings {a i,h n } n∈N 0 is called a pure public strategy. As a convenient notational device we define {F h n } n -adapted processes {α
and associate strategy profiles with α h n (α
The space of pure public strategies in the discrete-time game Γ h is denoted by A i,h . The set of pure public strategy pro--12-files is the Cartesian product A h ∏ 1≤i≤N A i,h . 14 For every action profile a ∈ A, define the probability law
Given Assumption 3.1, the measure ν h a is seen to satisfy the moment conditions
By construction, the support of each measure ν h a is the support of ρ and hence independent of the action profile as in Abreu et al. (1990) . 15 To understand this construction better, observe that if we take the probability measure P h a (ν h a ) ⊗N on the sequence space (E, B(E)) and run the iid process {ξ n } on the set-up (E, B(E), P h a ) (recall that these mappings are the canonical projections), then we see that the law of the individual projections is changed from ρ to ν h a . Hence, when running the process X h on this set-up, we see that its increments ∆X h n are still iid, but with mean hb(a) and covariance hCC . Now we generalize this setting to general public strategies, not only those which constantly play a single action profile. Hence, fix a strategy profile in feedback form {a h n } n≥0 and define a sequence of stochastic kernels {ν h n } n∈N 0 by
Public strategies are the usual class of strategies in games with public monitoring. Clearly enough, it is a restrictive class of strategies. However, it has some nice properties. First, it is closed under bestreplies, meaning that if the (N-1) other players use public strategies, there is a best-reply for the remaining player in public strategies as well. Second, public strategies allow us to use recursive techniques to analyze equilibrium payoff processes. Third, the probability distribution over the game tree induced by pure private strategies (i.e. strategies in which player i may condition on his own past decisions, unobservable to the opponents), can be copied by pure public strategies. Hence, they give rise to the same expected payoff. See Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for further discussion.
15 If the support of the probability measures ν h a shifted with the action profile, the players could in principle infer the action profile from the distribution function. The constant support hypothesis makes such a statistical inference impossible.
-13-ing our shorthand notation α h for the feedback strategy profile a h ∈ A h , we let P α h denote the induced probability measure on (E, B(E)), which is uniquely defined by the IonescuTulcea Theorem (see e.g. Ethier and Kurtz, 1986) . Under this measure, the cumulative signal process X h is a non-stationary Markov chain whose increments satisfy the moment conditions (P-a.s.)
Var (15) 3.2 Viewing Γ h as a continuous-time game
We think of the discrete-time game Γ h as a strategic interaction in continuous time t ∈ R + , but where changes in the environment happen only at multiples of a common mesh size h > 0. Hence, the time points where players observe a new signal and may adapt their actions are t h n = nh for n ∈ N 0 . Accordingly, the dynamic variables of the game are continuous-time processes with piecewise constant sample paths. Specifically, we denote byX h the piecewise constant interpolation of the discrete-time signal process, i.e.
The interpolated filtration is defined as F h t F h t/h for all t ≥ 0. The process α h t = α h n for t ∈ [t h n , t h n+1 ) denotes the interpolated strategy process. Next, we identify the driving noise process of the piecewise-constant dynamic. Let
is a zero-mean martingale difference under the measure P α h . Hence, {B h t } t≥0 is a càdlàg martingale with respect to the filtration {F h t } t≥0 with zero mean and covariance h Id, as one can easily check using eq. (14). In terms of this martingale noise process we obtain the sample path representation of the signal processX h as
This is the stochastic difference equation solved by the signal process X h when the players play the repeated game with the public strategy profile α h . The processB h is the driving martingale term of this stochastic difference equation, and thus will be our natural candidate to approximate a standard d-dimensional Wiener process. It is important to emphasize that we have not changed the definition of the stochastic process X h itself. This process is still generated by the equation (11), but its distribution is changed since the public strategies of the players influence the law of the per-period signal random variables ξ n .
Payoff processes in the discrete-time game
Given a public strategy profile α h , the cumulative payoff to player i at the beginning of stage n ∈ N 0 of the game Γ h is defined as
The functions φ i , ψ i are the same as in the continuous-time payoff process (3). Players discount future payoffs at the fixed positive rate r > 0, so that the weight of a period n payoff rate is
, where δ = δ h e −rh . The scalar δ ∈ (0, 1) can therefore be interpreted as the discount factor between two consecutive periods in the discrete-time game. Hence, the random discounted (normalized) payoff of player i in the discrete-time game is
Recall the definition of the function g i
which corresponds to the expected stage game payoff rate of player i when the increment distribution of the public signal process X h is ν h a (·). By Fubini's theorem, the normalized -15-discounted payoff of player i over the infinite time horizon can be expressed as
4. Convergence of the repeated game dynamics
Preliminary Discussion
The proof of convergence of the family of repeated games Γ h proceeds in two steps: First, we investigate the compactness properties of interpolated data (constructed in Section 3.2) describing the discrete-time interaction. This analysis will show that the signal process, as well as its driving martingale noise process, are tight sequences of random variables taking values in the space of right-continuous functions having left limits, denoted by D d . 16 We endow D d with the Skorokhod topology under which it becomes a complete separable metric space (see e.g. Jacod and Shiryaev, 2002 , for more details). Its induced Borel σ-algebra (i.e. the Borel sigma-algebra generated by the open sets of the Skorokhod topology) is denoted by D d . Relative compactness allows us to extract subsequences which converge in distribution. Moreover, a standard probabilistic construction, known as the Skorokhod representation, allows us to realize the stochastic processes on one common probability space (independent of the mesh size h), carrying random variables which are equal in law to the process (X h ,B h ), but which converge not only in law but even almost surely. 17 A delicate point in our convergence analysis is to understand the limit properties of the family of interpolated discrete-time public strategies. Since the space of pure public strategies is not weakly compact, we have to embed this space into a larger one, having the necessary compactness properties. This compactification of repeated game strategies is a well known tool in optimal control theory (Warga, 1972; Kushner and Dupuis, 2001; El Karoui et al., 1987) . We stick to the control-theoretic terminology and call the result-16 Let (Ω, F, P) be some probability space on which we have defined a sequence of random variables {Y n } n∈N taking values in some separable metric space (E, d). This sequence is tight if the induced family of probability measures P • Y −1 n = P n is tight. A family of probability measures {P n } n is tight if for each ε > 0 there exists a compact set K ⊂ E such that inf n∈N P n (K) ≥ 1 − ε. A family of probability measures {P n } n on a separable metric space (E, d) is tight if and only if it is relatively compact under the topology of weak convergence of measures on ∆(E). More details can be found in Ethier and Kurtz (1986) or Billingsley (1999) . 17 The use of the Skorokhod representation in our convergence analysis is completely justified, since only the distributional properties of the repeated game dynamics are what can be analyzed with weakconvergence arguments. The stochastic basis on which the limit processes are realized is not of any importance.
-16-ing objects relaxed control measures. Game-theoretically, a relaxed control measure is the appropriate continuous-time concept of a repeated game correlated strategy. 18 Once the convergence of the interpolated data has been settled, we show that the resulting limit processes solve a SDE identical to the projected SDE (6). Recall from our discussion in Section 2.3 that this SDE represents the evolution of the cumulative signal process X once we average over the public correlation device, and the laws of the public strategies are transported to relaxed control measures. As it will turn out, we will be able to compute expected payoffs of the players knowing only this projected system. It will become apparent that exactly this projected system is what can be approximated by sequences of discrete time games. Some implications of this result on the analysis of equilibria in continuous-time games are discussed in the concluding section of this paper.
Relaxed Control Measures
Given a public strategy profile in the discrete-time game α h , define
and
Observe that Λ h (A, T) = T for every T ≥ 0, so that the marginal distribution on the time dimension of any induced random measure Λ h is Lebesgue measure. Hence, for every h the family of random variables Λ h defines a random element of the space R(A × [0, ∞)) ≡ R, which we already encountered in Section 2.3. 19 Using the language introduced in that section, each random variable Λ h is a relaxed control. The triple (X h , Λ h ,B h ) completely describes the game dynamics of the discrete-time game Γ h when the public strategy α h is used. It is a random element of the spacẽ
18 Formally, our notion of convergence is what Neyman (2013) called w * convergence of Markov strategies (which is just weak * convergence in suitably defined function spaces). Our strategies are more complex objects than just Markov, which is the reason why we have to use the concept of weak convergence of relaxed controls. We share with Neyman (2013) the interpretation of the limit objects as correlated strategies. 19 Since players are assumed to use pure public strategies in the game Γ h , the measure Λ h is just the occupation measure of the strategy process.
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The following examples illustrate clearly why we have to use relaxed control measures in our convergence theorem.
Example 4.1. Correlation in the limit. There are two players with common action set A i = {0, 1}. For every h > 0 assume that the players use the following pure public strategy
The resulting profile of public strategies α h is clearly admissible in the game Γ h . However, defining the piecewise-constant interpolation α i,h t as above and looking at sample paths when the mesh size h goes to 0, shows that this function does not have a classical limit. This example is well known in optimal control theory, where it is known as the "chattering phenomenon". It would be unnatural to rule out such chattering controls. Hence, we have to use a weaker concept for a limit. The classical remedy to the chattering problem is to enlarge the space of admissible strategies. Hence, instead of the sequence of public strategies α h , we consider their "measure" representation (20) and the induced relaxed control measures Λ h (21). It follows from classical results (summarized in Appendix A) that every sequence of relaxed control measures has a weakly convergent subsequence. It can be checked that the weak limit of the relaxed control measure induced by this pair of strategies has a "density" given by
and it is clear that this measure in ∆(A) cannot be represented via independent randomization of the players. Only a correlated move can generate this distribution. Hence, there is correlation in the limit of frequent moves. 20
Example 4.2. Measurability in the limit. Another aspect why we obtain more general objects in the limit than standard strategies of the continuous-time game is that information becomes continuous and one cannot decide certain events of the approximating sequence in the limit anymore. As an example fix some time t ∈ R + and two profiles a and a with different drifts b(a) b(a ). Suppose that for any h > 0 the profile a is played for all n < t/h and also for n ≥ t/h if (∆X h t/h −1 − hb(a)) · 1 ≤ 0. Else the profile a is played. The probability distribution of the increment process ξ n under this strategy is therefore ν h a for n < t/h and ν h a for n ≥ t/h if (∆X h t/h −1 − hb(a)) · 1 ≤ 0 holds true. Using the definition of these probability laws given by eq. (12), it is clear that
and thus is independent of h. Below we will see that the public signalX h converges to a continuous (diffusion) process in the limit, that only changes its drift at the fixed time t with the given probability. Hence, it is not decidable by observing the limit signal process whether the switch has actually occurred.
Main Theorems
Following our previous discussion, we can identify the discrete-time repeated game with the triple (X h , Λ h ,B h ), constituting the information process, the relaxed control measure, and the driving martingale process, respectively. In terms of this triple, we now state the main results of this paper. The first theorem settles the question in which sense the family of discrete time games Γ h provides a foundation for the continuous-time game Γ. (ii) For a given subsequence (X h , Λ h ,B h ) (we do not relabel) there exist a subsubsequence and a probability space (Ω,F,P) such that convergence w.p.1 to a limit (X, Λ,B) holds. This limit triple has the following properties:
(ii.a) Λ is a relaxed control measure with almost sure decomposition
, thenB is a.s. continuous and is a standard Wiener process;
(ii.c) The processX is a.s. continuous and the tuple (Ω,Ḡ,
-19-is a weak solution of the stochastic differential equation
This theorem is proven by a sequence of intermediate propositions in Section 6. Tightness of the sequence of relaxed control measures is shown in Section 6.1. The tightness for the processesX h andB h is demonstrated in Proposition 6.3. Part (ii) of the theorem is the well-known Skorokhod representation. (ii.a) is shown in Proposition 6.2. (ii.b) and (ii.c) are shown in Section 6.2, following Proposition 6.3.
Some discussion on its implications is in order. The game dynamics which we obtain as a weak limit from the interpolated data (X h , Λ h ,B h ) are defined on a probability space which is larger than the one we have used in the explicit construction of the continuous-time process in Section 2. Neither does the information embodied in this setup correspond to the information the players have in the continuous-time game, nor do the random variables "look" like the ones we have used there. They only describe some continuous-time game in distribution. Hence, the proper way of interpreting Theorem 4.3 is not one of "strong convergence" in which the driving data of the repeated game literally converge to a limit repeated game, but rather that the limit objects we obtain are able to describe a continuous-time repeated game in distribution. 21 In particular, the process Λ which we obtain as the limit of the discrete-time relaxed control Λ h does not correspond to a relaxed control measure as the ones we have constructed in Section 2.3 (recall that the objects studied there are X t -adapted, while the limit isḠ t -adapted, a filtration which is strictly larger). This said, one may have serious doubts how relevant our theorem actually is. We can only provide a pragmatic reply to this concern: The expected payoff the players obtain in the game only depends on the distributions induced on the path space by the public strategy. As such, Theorem 4.3 says that the family of discrete-time game dynamics converges in distribution and thus allows us to assign a limit value to each family of discrete-time games. Viewed from this angle, our convergence analysis really shows what is possible, in terms of the expected payoffs, when passing to the limit. In fact, this leads us to the second main result of this paper.
Theorem 4.4 (Weak convergence of expected payoffs). Let {(X h , Λ h ,B h ); h ∈ (0, 1)} be a convergent family of random elements of the spaceZ obtained from the sequence of discrete-time games Γ h . In terms of the Skorokhod representation (Ω,F,P), (X h , Λ h ,B h ) (we do not relabel) we have
Conclusion
We have developed a consistent discrete-time approximation scheme for a class of repeated games in continuous time in which the players receive information through a diffusion signal driven by Brownian motion. Convergence of the family of discrete-time games happens rather generally, when only insisting on weak convergence of the interpolated game dynamics. As we have argued in the main text, weak convergence is sufficient when one is interested in obtaining a consistent approximation of the total life-long utility of a player. There are two issues which deserve more attention for future research: First, it is an open problem to get a general interpretation theorem for the limit set of relaxed controls in terms of continuous-time correlated strategies. Second, with our weak convergence arguments one is not able to say much about limits of public perfect equilibria of the game in discrete time. This is a complex topic which has, to our best knowledge, not been studied at all. A more refined analysis of the continuation value process is needed, which is initiated in Staudigl (2014b) . In that note a general martingale decomposition for the continuation value process in discrete time is performed, which is the closest possible representation of the corresponding continuous-time processes. While a complete convergence proof is out of reach at the moment, the reader will see that the martingale approach reveals a clean and transparent connection between discrete and continuoustime game theory. In fact, we strongly belief that within this martingale framework one is able to prove the convergence of the continuation payoff process to the corresponding continuous-time process, and we regard this as an important question for future research.
We also remark that the weak convergence approach of this paper can be extended to stochastic games with public signals. The arguments become, however, much more involved and can be found in Staudigl and Steg (2014) .
As a final remark we would like to point out that our analysis shows that continuoustime games can be "interpreted" as the limit objects of sequences of discrete-time games with frequent actions only if there is a public correlation device available to the players. Public correlation is frequently used in economics either to facilitate the analysis, or to capture exogenous uncertainty ("sunspots") (see e.g. Stokey and Lucas, 1989; Duffie et al., 1994) . Public correlation is also used in Staudigl (2014a) where a general control--21-theoretic framework is developed to compute the set of public perfect equilibrium payoffs in a continuous-time game. In that note a novel geometric characterization of the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in terms of PDEs and the principal curvatures of a self-generating set is derived.
6. Proofs
Compactness of relaxed controls
The main (technical) reason why we are interested in relaxed controls is the following fundamental property.
Proposition 6.1. The sequence of relaxed control measures {Λ h } h>0 is a tight family of random measures in R. Hence, every subsequence has a weakly convergent subsubsequence.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Given weak convergence we can make use of the Skorokhod representation theorem (see e.g. Ethier and Kurtz, 1986) . This theorem states that we can find a probability space (Ω,F,P) which carries a sequence of measure-valued random variablesΛ h , each of which is equal in law to Λ h , but which converges with probability 1 (i.e.P-almost everywhere) to the limit random measureΛ having the same law as Λ. Since all our statements are just concerned with weak convergence of processes, we usually do not make a notational distinction between the w.p.1 converging random variables guaranteed by the Skorokhod representation theorem and the original ones. For the limit Λ we have the following disintegration result. Proposition 6.2. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space andΛ a random element of R(A × [0, ∞)).
Then there exists
Proof. See Appendix A.1. This result ensures that any random measure Λ, defined as the almost sure limit under the Skorokhod representation of the sequence of relaxed control measures {Λ h } h>0 , admits the decomposition
by (iii), where λ is a measurable process by (ii) with values in ∆(A) by (i). The subsequent sections will relate this limiting process to a correlated strategy process of the continuoustime repeated game Γ. 22 6.2 Convergence of the signal process and the driving martingale noise
The first result we need for the weak convergence analysis is a compactness property of the processes {(X h ,B h ), h ∈ (0, 1)}. To establish this, we fix a sequence of public strategies {α h ; h ∈ (0, 1)}, where α h is the public strategy profile used in the discrete-time game Γ h . Proposition 6.3. The family of interpolated processes {X h } h>0 and {B h } h>0 is tight.
Proof. We use Aldou's tightness criterion to prove the claim (see e.g. Jacod and Shiryaev, 2002, Theorem 4.5, pp. 356) . Let K b max a∈A |b(a)|. Then, using (a + b) 2 ≤ 2a 2 + 2b 2 , it follows that
In the step to the last equality we have used an explicit computation of the norm CB h t 2 , 22 As the reader can see from the statement of the Proposition, the disintegration result holds for much more general action spaces than the finite ones we are considering in this paper. Indeed, our convergence theorem holds also if each individual action set A i is a compact separable metric space. More details are given in Appendix A.1.
-23-which will be given below. Using Chebyshev's inequality, we see that for every η > 0
Hence, for every δ > 0 we can choose η > K t δ so that
This gives the first condition in Aldou's tightness criterion. For the second condition we have to introduce some more notation. Let T h T be the set of F h t stopping times τ which are less or equal to T with probability 1. As in Billingsley (1999) (Theorem 16.9, pp. 177) , we have to show that for every η, ε, h there exist δ 0 and h 0 such that if δ ≤ δ 0 and h ≤ h 0 and
This follows if we can show that
Using Jensen's inequality and the strong Markov property of the processX h , the latter follows from the estimate
The tightness of the processB h is established in the same way. Since some of the bounds used in the argument will be useful later on to give a characterization of the weak limits of this process, we nevertheless give a sketch of the proof. Recall that
-24-where ε h n = ∆X h n − hb(α h n ) a martingale difference sequence under the measure P α h with
By definition of the martingale noise processB h we have
A straightforward computation, using (23) and the law of iterated expectations, shows that for all n This gives the first bound needed in Aldou's tightness criterion, and the second bound is obtained as in the case of the processX h .
Together with Proposition 6.1 this result shows that the triple {(X h , Λ h ,B h ); h ∈ (0, 1)} is tight as a family of random elements in the path spaceZ = D d × R × D d . Under our choice of norms, the spaceZ is separable and endowed with a metric which makes it complete. Under these topological conditions, tightness is equivalent to relative compactness, which means that for every subsequence of {(X h , Λ h ,B h ); h ∈ (0, 1)} there is a subsub--25-sequence, still denoted by {(X h , Λ h ,B h ); h ∈ (0, 1)}, converging in distribution to a limit (X, Λ,B). Take the converging subsequence {(X h , Λ h ,B h ); h ∈ (0, 1)} and its weak limit (X, Λ,B) as given for the remainder of this section. To complete the proof of Theorem 4.3 it remains to show that (a)B is a standard Wiener process with respect to {Ḡ t }, whereḠ t σ(X s , Λ(s),B s , s ≤ t);
(b)X is a.s. continuous;
(c) the tuple (Ω,Ḡ, {Ḡ t } t≥0 ,P,X, Λ,B) is a weak solution of the stochastic differential equation (22).
For every h > 0 the processB h is the driving noise of the public signal processX h . To show that the laws of the processes {B h } h>0 converge weakly to Wiener law on any [0, T], we can appeal to Theorem 8 in (Gihman and Skorohod, 1979, p. 197) . By (23) we have for every n ≥ 0
Therefore, we only have to show that the following Lindeberg-type condition holds under Assumption 3.1: For any γ > 0, Consider the k-th summand in (25), or actually its conditional expectation wrt. F h k as we are inside E P α h [·] . Recalling ε h k = ∆X h k − hb(α h k ) = √ hCξ k+1 − hb(α h k ) and that the law ν h α h k of ξ k+1 under P α h conditioned on F h k is that of ξ k+1 + √ hC −1 b(α h k ) under P (defined as ρ ⊗N ) we have
P α h -a.s. Hence, the left-hand side of (25) is
-26-
The last term vanishes as h 0 for fixed γ > 0, since the law ρ has finite second moment; cf. (9).
NowB has almost surely continuous paths since its distribution, the Wiener law, puts probability 1 on W d = C(R + ; R d ) ⊂ D d . Next we show that with probability 1 where λ = {λ t ; t ≥ 0} is taken from the disintegration of Λ according to Proposition 6.2. This will prove that (X, Λ,B) satisfy (22) and that alsoX has almost surely continuous paths. To establish (26) we make use of the Skorokhod representation theorem. Hence, we continue working on a new probability space (Ω,F,P) on which we have defined a family (X h ,Λ h ,B h ) which, for every h ∈ (0, 1), is a random element of the setZ, and whoseP-law equals the P α h -law of the original triple (X h , Λ h ,B h ). As the specific probability space is of no importance for our arguments we stick to the original notation and simply assume that (X h , Λ h ,B h ) converge almost surely to (X, Λ,B). X h andB h converge in the Skorokhod topology while the measures Λ h converge weakly to the measure Λ as a random element of the space R. Then, as b is bounded and t → Λ(a, [0, t)) uniformly continuous, the RHS of converges also in the Skorokhod topology 23 to the RHS of (26) (as functions of t ∈ R + ). Hence we have (26) with probability 1.
Finally we show that the weak limitB of the processesB h is a martingale wrt. {Ḡ t }, whereḠ t σ(X s , Λ(s),B s , s ≤ t). We establish this by proving that for fixed times t, s > 0
